WHY wOBA AFFECTS BEST HITTERS AND FAVORS WORSE? THE SYNDROME OF AVERAGE & THE WAIBI PULSE
This article references:
- Why "The Book" is a Sabermetric’s masterpiece and an excellent reference book?
- wOBA operation step by step.
- Sport’s aleatority vs. Random’s aleatority.
- Use vs overuse of averages in Sabermetrics. Error-In in wOBA averages, step by step.
- What really measures the Runs Value of wOBA?
- Brief introduction to the calculation of Waibi Pulse.
Here’s the
offensive component of WAR, possibly the most used sabermetric stats of recent
times. WAR calculates the integral contribution from
each player to his team, in relation to the league average, including defensive
performance.
wOBA is On
Base Weighted Average, and its formula is:
Being NIBB, the unintentional bases
on balls; HBP, hit by pitch; and RBOE, the bases reached by error. When
we compare it with the OPS (OBP + SLG), we see that the parameters are very
similar, except for the inclusion of errors.
For the common viewer, the biggest concern surfaces because of constant numbers
preceding each parameter in the formula, ingenious result of its creators, Tom
Tango, Mitchel Lichtman and Andrew Dolphin. It first appeared in "The Book: Playing the Percentages in Baseball".
It’s truly the most complete and complex algorithm of those used in
offensive statistics. Or at least,
of those which their creators have made public. Public? Yes, of course. We must remember that the statistical
interpretation is an art in Baseball, almost exactly to what Intelligence is in a war. Many interpretive systems creators,
have been hired by professional leagues
teams, when they’ve demonstrated the usefulness of their method. These systems continue
developing, or at least they can become more accurate, due to the access to new
resources and interests, which improve the quality of processed information. For this reason,
it’s highly probable that the current system used by these analysts, is much
deeper than those formulas explained for public use. Remember that almost every MLB team
has a high functionality statistical department. This contract wouldn’t have sense if it were limited only to a
public formula that everyone can execute and analyze.
"The
Book: Playing the Percentages in Baseball" is a masterpiece of analysis in
Baseball, with a high level of objectivity and rigor. It’s a book that every fan should read and try to
understand. Many appearances are unmasked through the scientific method,
shattering the unavoidable subjectivity that creates what we see in the field. At another time, we’ll delve into this marvel. Now
let's concentrate on wOBA’s formula, the most used, at least by the media and
fans.
In
recent time, there’re different considerations to calculate wOBA. Its
integration in the wRAA formula is another great intention to acchives more
accuracy in the results. The web site Fan Graphs have publicated yearly the
recent wOBA’s versions, where the coefficents, and the compensation changes
each season. Even, they don´t includes the RBOE. Anyway, Waibi consider the
principal problema it’s precisely, the “SINDROME of AVERAGE”, which still
exists in the recent versions. So, in order to understand it better, let’s
analyze it using wOBA’s foundations; so, the original fórmula.
Waibi Sabermetrics
System considers this interesting formula an useful tool for historical
statistics, and to select A GROUP of players in the league. Never for a final selection, ie,
it doesn’t allow to choose A PLAYER in a group, unless the difference between
him and the rest is really overwhelming.
wOBA helps to give us an idea of the hitter’s overall quality. For example, if we
need to acquire a slugger for our team, it will tell us which ones aren’t
eligible. Being based on very broad averages, it leaves us mathematically in
the dark when we must choose JUST ONE FROM A PRESELECTED GROUP.
Each number
have two parts: the number itself, and its compensation. Compensation is an inclusion of 15% of the real value, so it can be
readed and interpreted in the same way that the OBP. This makes it easier to
understand it. Now, how the value of each number was obtained?
These
recognized statheads were based on three main general approaches:
- Base / Out States
- General Data from 1999 to 2002 seasons
- Individual data for each type of event
GLOBAL BASE/OUTS_STATES
| |||||
1B
|
2B
|
3B
|
0 Outs
|
1 Out
|
2 Outs
|
–
|
–
|
–
|
0,555
|
0,297
|
0,117
|
1B
|
–
|
–
|
0,953
|
0,573
|
0,251
|
–
|
2B
|
–
|
1,189
|
0,725
|
0,344
|
–
|
–
|
3B
|
1,482
|
0,983
|
0,387
|
1B
|
2B
|
–
|
1,573
|
0,971
|
0,466
|
1B
|
–
|
3B
|
1,904
|
1,243
|
0,538
|
–
|
2B
|
3B
|
2,052
|
1,467
|
0,634
|
1B
|
2B
|
3B
|
2,417
|
1,650
|
0,815
|
I’ll explain briefly: Each time a
team founds "bases loaded & no outs", it scored 2,417 runs on
average before the third out, as each time there was "bases empty & no
outs", it scored 0,555 as average. This is, in
my personal point of view, the third most important conceptual contribution to
the statistics in Baseball, after its creation by Henry Chadwick, and the
flowering of Billy Jame’s Sabermetrics, in this order.
It’s fair to
say that the american Pete Palmer, who wrote the foreword to the "The
Book: Playing the Percentages in
Baseball", developed his first investigations basing on the "Play by Play" notation,
using the 1956-1960 World Series Data. These data were taken from the Sporting
News Baseball Guides, because at that time this system wasn’t established on a large scale. However, with his book "The Hidden Game of
Baseball" Palmer pioneered a new way for Sabermetric’s development.
3. INDIVIDUAL
EVENTS
They
processed each specific event including initial and final Base/Out_State’s Run
Expectancies, and run produced specifically
for each event (H, HR, E, BB, HBP, etc). Thus, for example, a
"runner on third & one
out" State has a Run Expectancy of 0.983.
The batter hits a double and the runner on third scores. So, it pass to a final
state of "runner on second & one out", which has an expectation
of 0.725. As one run was scored, the operation
would be: 1 + 0.725 - 0.983. So, this double,
have an specific Run Value of 0.742.
Being REFn,
the final Base/Out_State’s
Run Expectancies; R the runs, and REIn; the initial B/O_State’s Run
Expectancies.
Let's
concentrate on homers behavior by B/O_States, regarding Run Value. We’ll use homers as model, because within hitting
parameters, it’s the least complicated to handle in a short explanation.
HOMERS RUN VALUE BY BASE/OUTS_STATES
| |||||
1B
|
2B
|
3B
|
0 Outs
|
1 Out
|
2 Outs
|
–
|
–
|
–
|
1
|
1
|
1
|
1B
|
–
|
–
|
1,602
|
1,725
|
1,865
|
–
|
2B
|
–
|
1,367
|
1,573
|
1,772
|
–
|
–
|
3B
|
1,073
|
1,314
|
1,729
|
1B
|
2B
|
–
|
1,983
|
2,326
|
2,651
|
1B
|
–
|
3B
|
1,651
|
2,054
|
2,579
|
–
|
2B
|
3B
|
1,504
|
1,830
|
2,483
|
1B
|
2B
|
3B
|
2,139
|
2,647
|
3,302
|
By averaging
each of these data, obtained through the 21 026 home runs analyzed by B/O_State, the chart tells us that an average homer produces 1,397 runs. The next table shows the average value per event.
Event
|
RV
|
Event
|
RV
|
HR
|
1.397
|
BK
|
0.264
|
3B
|
1.070
|
NIBB
|
0.323
|
2B
|
0.776
|
IBB
|
0.179
|
RBOE
|
0.508
|
SB
|
0.175
|
INT
|
0.392
|
DI
|
0.120
|
SAC
|
-0.096
|
BUNT
|
0.042
|
PB
|
0.269
|
PK
|
-0.281
|
1B
|
0.475
|
OUT
|
-0.299
|
WP
|
0.266
|
K
|
-0.301
|
HBP
|
0.352
|
CS
|
-0.467
|
One of the
strengths of the analysis of Tango, Dolphin and Lietchmann, is undoubtedly the
study of Markov’s Chains presents in random systems like Baseball. This type of chain, describes a system of consecutive
probabilities, where the flow of these depends on the previous action. This kind of techniques as been widely successfully used from meteorology to physics, epidemiology,
economics and finance, or predictions of gambling and market movements, among
others. The management of these data allowed them to make an interesting
as necessary study, on batting order conception.
His detailed analysis broke so ingrained myths, like that the third turn in the
line up should be reserved for the best hitter of the team.
RUN VALUE
We had seen
that conceptually, if we suppress the numerical constants, wOBA’s calculation
is very similar to OBP, but adds the “on based by error”, and eliminates
“intentional walks”. The OBP counts like “1” all the actions in which the player gets
on base, and couts like “0” when he is out. To obtain the coefficients, we add
to each value a number that allows to convert to “0”, the Run Value for the
event "Out", which according to the table is -0,299. I mean, +0,299 must be added to each
event.
RV INIC
|
PLUS 299
|
PLUS 15%
|
RV FINAL
| |
HR
|
1,397
|
1,696
|
1,950
|
1,95
|
3B
|
1,070
|
1,369
|
1,574
|
1,56
|
2B
|
0,776
|
1,075
|
1,236
|
1,24
|
1B
|
0,475
|
0,774
|
0,890
|
0,90
|
RBOE
|
0,508
|
0,807
|
0,928
|
0,92
|
HBP
|
0,352
|
0,651
|
0,749
|
0,75
|
NIBB
|
0,323
|
0,622
|
0,715
|
0,72
|
As shown, there’re differences of
few hundredths between the coefficient numbers used in the formula (in black),
and the "PLUS 15" column. This happens because of rounding. In some phases of data
processing, it was applied to facilitate handling. In math, every time we turn to this, a small error is
introduced.
The best thing is not to round up, but if we have to, it’s better to wait until
the last operation.
Especially in this case, where various coefficients are applied in the same
formula. The mathematical rounding
applies by "default" or "excess", so in some cases, the
actual value will be greater than the used
one, and in other ones less. This
rounding in opposite directions, logically increases much more the Error-in.
Let's see: why do we care so much about what the group does, if we choose a player and not the whole group of players? It should be a comparative-informative matter, not a selective one. With the increasing of Baseball’s quality in the world, the players from best leagues are getting closer to the standard player, making the system of compared averages, somewhat inefficient to select a player over another. The best thing is to process each performance by itself (I mean, individually), rather than depending on the average. Like this, we would ensure a maximum decrease of allowable errors. WAIBI wields this principle as his Holy Grail: every action is unique, each player an individual, and each moment a circumstance. The challenge is to turn it in numbers, as closely to reality as possible. It's the same difference, for example, between describing a person in a non specific way: "... he is tall, slim, wearing long hair and he is of greater age ..."; and another person described by his individuality: "... height 6.5, weight 70 kilos, curly black shiny hair tied in a ponytail, he’s 60 years old, and also smokes and is allergic to shellfish...". The difference about the objective adjustment to reality is clear, right? In addition, we must remember one basic principle: a team is a highly functional and complimented players gear, and not an "All Stars Team" as most of the fans think.
OVERALL,
there’s the frightful misconception that statistics must be understandable and
applicable for everyone related to Baseball, from the fans to the team
managers. Commonly there’re designed formulas that can
be easily used, with paper and pencil, or at the most, with a good calculator. However, the
mathematical complexity of the game and its events are so great, that when we
try to group, to reduce or to synthesize, we’re increasing significantly the
margin of error. Baseball can not be objectively
analyzed by an archaic tool such as a calculator ... It would be at least like
trying to find a high complexity natural logarithm, counting on fingers.
As it’s impossible (so far) this numerical
specification of the game actions, we must apply averages. In that case, WAIBI tries not to abuse its use. In other words, to use it only
if there’s not a more functional mathematic algorithm.
Let’s see wOBA’s averages:
1. FIRST AVERAGE: It’s calculated on the Base/Outs_States. As the objective is to have an idea of scoring,
starting from each possible moment of the inning, we make a logical operation
of average. So, we’ll know our PROBABILITIES to
score since each situation or state.
As this operation regards the inning, we
must to count until it’s finalized. But, by using this system,
flourishes the great conflict generated by this syndrome: AVERAGE
EXPECTATION RARELY MATCHES WITH THE EXPECTATION OF THE SPECIFIC SITUATION, BUT
DECISIONS ARE TAKEN AS IF THEY WERE ALWAYS SO.
Let’s consider this
"crazy" but illustrative example:
if a primitive man would have seen up
a black & white chessboard for the first time, since a sufficiently
large distance, surely he would’ve seen a single gray color. That would
be the average color that our retina achives to interpret. Why? Because of the
distance, the human eye is unable to accurately define the object, so, it INTEGRATES
the information.
Not knowing the actual design, if he would have wanted to copy it, basing on
the visual information he had, probably he would’ve painted a monochrome gray square in the wall of his
cave. Nothing further from a chessboard! Therefore,
his mark in history would have reflected
what he thought he saw and not what it really was. When some millennia later this rock art
will be discovered, the archaeologists will interpret the gray square in the
cave as anything except a chessboard.
This
somewhat picturesque parallel, is what happens in this type of statistics, as
discussed below. In baseball, every situation is
specific, as each one of the 64 little squares in the chessboard has a specific
placement and color (particularity), what the eye in the distance (generality,
average) fails to distinguish.
The sensitive
point here is that we’re not talking about a specific number of runs, but
about the PROBABILITY to score them,
according to historical data! Then, the
first obstacle to overcome is the database (1999-2002). This is a basic
and recurrent method in the statistical analysis, when samples are large
enough, and the characteristics are the same in greater or lesser degrees. To understand more easily what happen
in baseball statistics, we turn to the example of the dices, the tipycal used
to explain probabilities situations.
A mathematician would conclude that IF THE DICE ARE NOT "LOADED"
OR MANIPULATED, the probability of getting a determined number will always be
1/6. A physicist would say that it’s possible,
if THE SIX SIDES ARE COMPENSATED. But, is it not the same condition?
Apparently yes, but not really. The difference in approach defines the presence
or the absence of an error between the actual phenomenon and its theoretical
model. An important amount of the dices used in the world, use holes to
represent the value of each side. So, the weight of each side slightly decreases as the
corresponding figure. Thus is, it will have slightly more chances to
obtain a 6 rather than an 1, due to displacement of the center of gravity by
the slight mass differences between two opposite faces.
While closer are the opposite
numbers, there will be less differences
between their chances (4 and 3). So, although they’re
theoretically equal (under Math’s point of view), in homogeneous mass leaky
craps, there’s actually a slightly greater chance of getting 6, 5 and 4, than
3, 2 and 1, in this order. The discrepancy will be greater, depending on the size of the
holes, conceived by the dice’s designer.
So, how do they compensate?
A) If the union of the volumes of the
holes on each side were equal (where the Six’s small holes were equivalent to
the One’s hole volume)
B) Painting the numbers, so, the
sides remain flatbed.
From this conditions, the mathematical approach assumes
either, while the phisical model just
the second.
Why? Because differents shape and distribution of the holes would
make the physics forces act particularly on each side, mainly the friction,
both in the air and on the board. This would alter the parity
of the possibilities. Therefore, the dots must be painted. Only in this
way, each side has a real expectation of 1/6 to appear in every shot. Despite
this, the dices with holes are highly used and marketed as balanced dices.
This phenomenon of small specific
differences, is usual in many mathematical models, because these always "infer" the physical
homogeneity of the elements involved, which in the real world hardly exist. The analysis combined with physical models,
brings us closer to reality. Just with a mathematical model it
would’ve been impossible to travel to the Moon, or put an artificial satellite
into orbit.
Now, what is
meant by "load the dice”? It is when the weight distribution is altered to
favor the chance of a side over another. But, can we increase this probability without
resorting to fraud? And Physics says: YES, DEFINITELY !! And
here it’s where it gets interesting! The surface resistance and
the impact of gravity on the dice, both the size and the weight, relatively
reduce features like the twist, the rebound and displacement. Therefore,
we can exercise some control over these "definitive"
probabilities put forward by the Maths.
Imagine we
have a dice with porous surfaces, one kilogram of weight, and five inches of
measure in each edge. Let’s launch it from the same height and with similar
speed of a normal dice, on a little stiff soil. The odds that always comes out
the face we want, overwhelmingly increase, if we’re careful to put the craps in
the same starting position, and throw it with the same movement and strength.
That is to say, the mathematical odds on both dice are the same, but the
possibilities to manipulate them LEGALLY, are extremely different. This is
what DISTINGUISHES SPORTS FROM GAMING: you can "control" the aleatority
with some success, although the theoretical mathematical probabilities remain
the same! And this capacity
sets A GREAT RIFT BETWEEN THE SPECIFIC SITUATION AND THE PREDICTIVE STATISTICS
obtained by the general behavior of similar phenomena.
But then, what’s the difference with the
"loaded" dices? In this case, the weight
distribution isn’t equitative. So, you’ll
get the same specific number (side), independently the way you execute the
shot. Your ability is not what defines the result. This
overwhelms us away from the reality of the performance. More
unbalanced they are, the interpretation error will be greater.
IT’S WHAT MAKES DOPING IN SPORT.
But going even further: if we use more
than one dice: are they equally
"loaded"?
If so, the probabilities are altered proportionately for all the results. But if each dice has a different level of
manipulation of its center of gravity, the error is introduced like
"amalgam", making more unusable the data to predict future events,
because both craps have the same code (1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6), and the annotation
doesn’t distinguish a dice from another. This
just follow the overall results (cumulative statistics). So,
we see it’s not only important to understand the condition but also the
particular magnitude of it.
Summarizing, SPORT HAS A RELATIVE
INTRINSIC ALEATORITY, THAT RANDOM EMULATES ONLY WHEN CHEATING.
Let's now look
at the Mayor Leagues Baseball: what happened significantly in these
years, which prevent us from using them as reliable data to find our averages? If we look at the home
runs progression in recent seasons, jump to the view something important:
HRS
| |||
SEASON
|
MLB
|
AL
|
NL
|
2014
|
4 186
|
2 161
|
2 025
|
2013
|
4 661
|
2 504
|
2 157
|
2012
|
4 934
|
2 500
|
2 434
|
2011
|
4 552
|
2 271
|
2 281
|
2010
|
4 613
|
2 209
|
2 404
|
2009
|
5 042
|
2 560
|
2 482
|
2008
|
4 878
|
2 270
|
2 608
|
2007
|
4 957
|
2 252
|
2 705
|
2006
|
5 386
|
2 546
|
2 840
|
2005
|
5 017
|
2 437
|
2 580
|
2004
|
5 451
|
2 605
|
2 846
|
2003
|
5 207
|
2 499
|
2 708
|
2002
|
5 059
|
2 464
|
2 595
|
2001
|
5 458
|
2 506
|
2 952
|
2000
|
5 693
|
2 688
|
3 005
|
1999
|
5 528
|
2 635
|
2 893
|
As shown,
the production of homers was overloaded in these years, being widely 1999, 2000
and 2001 those with the highest amount
in the last fifteen seasons. Sometimes
even more than 1000 units above the currents. In 2000, 1507 more homers were hit than
in the 2014 season. This was a very critical time for the MLB records, because
of the shadow of doping. Several
players who resorted to this fraud to improve their performances, made these
statistics a dubious data for any analysis. This is because not only the
Produced Runs are oversized, but all offensive parameters, including
intentional walks, and even HBP. We all remember the battle for the homer’s record between
Sosa and McGwire (1998 / 66_70). Then Barry Bonds (2001/73). However,
in recent times, there’re few players who exceed the amount of forty home runs
per season.
There was
also the doctored balls theory. Some
unofficial analysis reported changes in the ball rubber core by a cork core, or
anomalies in rebounding of balls manufactured in 1999 and 2000. This theory,
however, was "discarded" after the steroids scandal.
This statistical imbroglio would’ve been partially repairable, if all
players of all teams, in all seasons would’ve used steroids; or
better yet, none of them.
Thus, there would’ve been a statistical ratio usable in other years. But unfortunately, we’ll never know how many
players used steroids or for how long, which introduces amalgamated
mathematical errors. We don’t know how much they altered the statistics used to
calculate wOBA’s coefficients.
On the other hand, if we make a superficial analysis, we would think that
the decline in home runs is definitely due to a greater control over prohibited
substances. But another key element in our list of circumstance is that in
those years MLB still hasn’t materialized decisive actions to restore the
strike zone. There was a great arbitrariness in the enforcement’s criterion,
which directly influences the generation or not of runs.
The QuesTech and MLB contract to develop a digital system for monitoring and
evaluating count’s arbitration (2001),
brought a remarkable change in the strike zone. Such adjustment initially made batting easier,
but at the same time, it forced each pitcher to add new types of throws,
release angles and pitching strategies, and to increase the throwing accuracy. If we return to the table of
homers per season, we see that around 2006, the production gradually drops to
less than 5 000. Probably, it
corresponds to the transition period of adaptation to the new strike zone. This, and the increasing of the number of teams that nourish MLB, have
greatly increased the pitchers quality and specialization. Therefore, hitters today
face in general a tougher pitching. Furthermore,
generational and technological changes make players behave technically and
tactically in a better way. Then, the data
would be useful if this situations wouldn’t have changed, as haven’t changed
the proportions between the sides of each dice.
With all these circumstantial elements in our balance,
let’s see the proportional change between the seasons 2011-2014, compared to
those of 1999-2002.
The red bars are the parameters
proportions in the data evaluated to obtain the wOBA’s coefficients , and the
yellow ones, are the proportion of the same parameters in the last four years. Runs are the
referential data between proportions. So, the comparison shows a significant
but equitative decrease in RBI, R, HR and BB (approximately -15%). H, 2B, 3B and AVG,
also decreased, but just between 5 and
8%. The Stolen Bases
are about 5% more per run, but about 3% less of runners were caught. The Strike Outs increased by almost
15%, eventhough the real strike zone reestablishment, favors hitters and affects
pitchers. Obviously, the numbers used like model have a very
different behavior and, above all, are indefinitely disproportionated to
current campaigns. For example, when
we see the number of runs, we could roughly say that a HR still have about the
same cost as in 2002. However, the value of doubles and
triples decreased visibly, so, a greater amount is needed to produce the same
Runs.
In brief, this average
tells us what is our chance of scoring, according to the Base / Out
State where we are, but the data is visibly affected from one period to
another. I mean, all real coefficient have changed. For
this reason, nowaday the most important stathead groups, PROCESS EACH SEASON DATA
INDEPENDENTLY, so, THE COEFFICIENTS IN THE FORMULA CHANGE EVERY YEAR. Despite this, a lot of fans and journalist continue
to using the coefficients used in the first version of the formula. The web
sites Fan Graph and Baseball References (among others) use his own wOBA’s
versions to analyze the players performance. ALSO THE COMPENSATION NUMBER CHANGES.
2. SECOND AVERAGE: It’s calculated
on each type of events. Here there’re two
introductions of errors among the most important. First, when are distinguished the value of some specific
actions. As we
understand, it’s a mistake to separate the situations that cause the same
reactions. I mean, there’re no differences, nor from the defensive
disposition or from the offensive strategy, if with clean bases, a runner
reaches the first base by error, hit,
base on balls, hit by pitch, or another one that permit it. A very
light change could be in the psyche of the pitcher, but in practice, everyone's
mind is focused in a “runner on first base” situation, with certain amount of
outs, and not on how the runner got it, especially when we talk about
professional players. The
chances of scoring runs are exactly the same. This unnecessary
fragmentation INTRODUCES A DIFFERENCE IN
READING SOME PARAMETERS, THAT DOESN’T EXIST.
Thus, we see in the final wOBA’s formula,
that a HBP has a Run Value of 0.75, and a BB
0.72. This difference makes us ponder a batter above
another in a wrong way, if we look at wOBA as a
STATISTICS FOR SELECTION.
The occurrence disproportion between both parameters introduces palpable
differences. It’s similar to
AVG’s value when there’re just few at-bats. Therefore,
logically, the AVG analysis is subordinated to the number of opportunities, not
only to the percentage obtained. Thus, in 1999 to 2002 seasons, there were
produced 68180 BB, for only 6 792 HBP,
just a 9.96%.
And here it
manifests another variant of the "Default Syndrome" . According to the formula, a
batter who receives 10 HBP, provides more runs than one who gets 10 BB. However, the HBP is A PITCHER’S MISTAKE, where the
batter has no merit at all; meanwhile the BB it’s the opposite. The same applies to the RBOE (reached base by
error). This parameter
has more Run Value (0.92) than single hits (0.90). The proportion of occurrence
was 117 099 singles, by only 13 539 bases reached by errors (11.56%). Some wOBA’s
recents version don’t use the RBOE. Anyway, each RBOE and HBP represent a
runner on base, with a punctual incidence on scoring. So we can’t eliminate
these parameters from the analysis, but we can’t count them like hitter’s Positive Actions. Recent wOBA’s
algorithms don’t achieve to manage this delicate situation.
Here we see a cause more to assessing wOBA as an historical statistics
rather than a selective one. Remember: A historical statistics
register the global performance, I mean, everything that happened. A selection stats, tries to
choose a player above another, for their
individual capacities. However, wOBA’s algorithm processes two variables that
are opponent’s errors. This means that
even thought these parameters were not because of hitters Positive Actions,
they’re counted as such, confounding the final result. Further,
they’ve technically more value (according to the formula) than two fundamental hitters
Positive Actions, as Single and Walked. Recall the absurd
example of the primitive man seeing the chessboard. When that information is integrated in wOBA’s formula, we
can’t say what percentage belongs to opponent’s errors, or what to hitter’s
virtues. But when we compare using these statistics, we interpret (by Default)
that the number obtained is a direct product of hitter’s quality which is what interest us. The higher value given to the opponet’s Negative Actions takes
us away
from the answer we’re looking for, without us noticing it.
Moreover, objectively, to
choose one player above another, we’re not interested on bases
reached by errors and HBP because
of its full wild randomness (if we eliminate the intentionality on any HBP). They’re the only
two events that neither contrary has the legal intends to perform, mainly
errors, where both teams fail. In order to understand: a batter with horrible
reflexes, who get 100 HBP, and 100 errors on his in-play balls, would have a
higher wOBA than Ichiro Suzuki in a campaign where he acchieves 182 hits in 200
appearances. Nothing more and nothing less than 910 AVG!!!! However, any
runner on base represents a scoring posibility, and he could have influences on
the rest of the inning, or even of the game. For that reason, Waibi designs the
WAIBI PULSE.
We must insist on
understanding something about the so revisited randomness: In baseball, the randomness is relative because of one important
factor: The player. The player always tries to achieve an objective depending
on his own abilities and those of his opponents. According concentration levels
and technical and tactical training (among others) are taken seriously by the
player, this randomness is "controlled" more frecuently by the most
capables. Baseball is a probabilities game, but although there’s a Ramdom’s
providential intervention in many circumstances, it’s above all things, a game
of individual skills subordinated to a collective and a purpose. THIS ISOLATED INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY IS
WHAT WE WANT TO EVALUATE IN A SELECTION STATS.
Ramdomness
is conceptually opposite to the intentionality, if you have enough tools and
abilities, as we saw earlier in the example of the dices. Nevertheless,
both phenomena coexist in Sport. There’s a baseball phrase that says:
"Homer just happens, you don’t look for
it." However, it’s possible to “look for” a home run, and it's not
just about swinging for the fences.
Unfortunately, this is what’s believed. Likewise with a bunt-moving, this is
about having an effective method which overcomes the opposite one to avoid it.
If it was not so, how could some Circus’s performers hit repeatedly a small
moving target with a knife? How could others cut a cigarette in three parts
with a whip, while another person held it in the mouth, without hurting? And
what about the horse archers, riding over a rough terrain with no other support
than their legs, while shooting arrows with great accuracy? There’s a lot of
ancient armies with this amazing soldiers (Mongols, Huns, Samurais, Sarmatians,
Parthians and others). So, the
human body is an amazing machine, in which most players operate only in a very
physical level. So, when they’re
“looking for" a home run, this mean swinging at the ball as hard as
possible, hoping for a homer. And that’s precisely what prevents, in most
cases, that they achieve the target. In another article we’ll delve into this.
We just add that THE KEY IS TO HIT THE BALL IN THE CENTER, with the right angle
and a certain force. When we exceed that force, as happen most of the times, we
affect the other two variables (point and angle of contact with the ball)
... It’s in these conditions where
Random, and not the sporting talent, does eventually match the three variables
at the same time, and the homer happens. This doesn’t mean that the homer will
always be achieved, but definitely will occur more often.
The second important error-in at this wOBA’s phase,
occurs with events of the same type, in different B/O_State. Remember, we’re
dissecting wOBA as a SELECTION STATS. So, let's analyze what happen with
homers:
To implement
the coefficients in the formula, we go through this procedure. Each specific
data (HR, H, 2B, 3B, BB, HBP, etc), is processed according to each specific
Base/Out_State. This will give us
the Run Value by event. In the specific case of homers it’s very simple to understand it, because
it’s a single action, which always ends in the same state of "bases empty". In the graph, the first group of columns, is
the Run Value when the initial state is also "bases empty". The following three groups, are
the states with a runner on circulation. The next three, with two on bases. The
last one refers to the Grand Slams.
Here are
shown behaviors related to:
A. Amount of runners on bases.
B. Number of outs in the inning
C. Runners closeness to
the plate.
Logically,
home runs have more value, when find more runners on bases. But ... what about
Homer’s Run Value variation in the same inning?:
1. The VALUE
IS CONSTANT when the bases are empty.
2. With
runners on bases, the VALUE INCREASES as more outs in the inning.
3. With
runners on bases, the VALUE DECREASES as more the runners advance.
Does it make
any sense? Why this behavior? When trying to find out how many runs more than
expected produces a hitter, the formula directly relate a SPECIFIC VALUE with a
PROBABILITY. In fact, what’s being measured is "how much the TEAM has
exceeded the scoring expectations for that specific situation." And then,
"how much are the TEAM’s new scoring expectations, after THIS HITTER’S
intervention." It lacks of a comparative analytical value, because in the
generalization of the formula, the relativity of the datum is canceled,
notwithstanding is precisely this relativity what gives it relevance. To make
you understand: a batter who hits a home run with bases loaded with no outs,
generates a Run Value of 2,139; but doing so with two outs, the value is 3,302.
However, the real value of runs, in both cases, is the same (4), which is what
really matters. Therefore, when we use wOBA as a selection stats, the relativity
of data favors batters that hit homers with more outs in the inning. That is,
the RUN VALUE IS MORE ASSOCIATED TO CONDITIONS
THE BATTER CAN’T CONTROL, which
are completely random (like in which order occur his At_Bat in the
inning, or how advanced were the runners, among others.) THAN TO THOSE DETERMINED BY HIS DIRECT ACTION
(relative randomness); precisely what we want to evaluate.
This
moment’s evaluation (related to outs in the inning) may have some sense in
sports like Long Jump and High Jump, and others where it’s important who gets
first to the result. The most important point is that in these sports, all
attempts are executed by the same athlete. I mean, each athlete is a team. In
baseball this is meaningless, because the actions are performed by different
batters that must be evaluated under the same conditions, as much as possible.
Thus, the leadoff of each line up, are more likely to be favored by these situations
(from their second appearance), because he’s preceded by the weakest hitters in
the line-up (8th & 9th). Furthermore, they bat at least once in each game,
with no outs on the board (first appearance). Thus, two batters with similar
qualities, will have different data depending on the offensive characteristics
of their respective team, and not necessarily on themselves.
Regarding
the advance of the runners, we wonder why the Run Value decreases, as they are
closer to the plate. The same. This means that there’re greater chances of
scoring. When we subtrack the PROBABILITY
from the SPECIFIC DATA, we’re favoring the batter who hit the home run with
runners furthest from the plate, because they've less probabilities to score before the end of the inning. However, the actual value
of the homer is still the same. Thus, those players in slower line ups, with
less base_stealers, or with more deficiencies when running bases, will be more favored.
THIRD AVERAGE: As it was extremely difficult to know the initial and final states of each event separately, the creators of wOBA decided to average each event by B/O_State, and leave it in a number. Logically, this greatly facilitates the calculation. This number (plus its15%) is the coefficient used in the formula for each parameter. By resorting to this method, is implemented a system whose functionality is very similar to Slugging. Except that instead of using integer numbers relating to run bases, it uses decimal numbers concerning to scoring probabilities, plus some additional parameters. By including the generated runs, and not just the dimensions of the hit, it introduces an important perception error. In wOBA, all hits of the same type, have the same Run Value, just as in the Sluging the same kind of hit has the same run distance value. The conceptual problem here is that SLUGGING IS RELATED ON EACH SINGLE AND SPECIFIC ACTION, while RUN’S PRODUCTION IS DUE TO A COMBINATION OF CONSECUTIVE ACTIONS. Thus, a player who hit a triple or a double with bases loaded, provides, just with this action, three times more runs, than another that produces a homer with empty bases. However, using its coefficients, wOBA confers 1.56 and 1.95 respectively (with 15% compensation) regardless of the actual contribution. So, THE SLUGGING ALWAYS REPRODUCES THE EXACT REALITY, WHILE THE wOBA ALMOST NEVER.
Summarizing, in this system of averages, and with the final calculations, a solo homer always gets a 70% extra bonus, while a triple with the bases loaded, is penalized with 54.78% less than the real value. Ironically, wOBA aims to determine who are the more productive hitters, but by using the system of averages, it ends affecting them, and favoring those whose production is actually lower than the average
In order to understand: using the above two examples, imagine that two batters produce 10 hits in 20 at bats distributed in 10 situations of "bases empty" and 10 of "bases loaded". The batter “A” hits 10 homers, but always with "bases empty"; and the batter “B”, hits 10 triples, but always with "bases loaded". Both have an AVG of .500. But wOBA favors the first (10 x 1.95 / 20 = 0.975) instead of the second one (10 x 1.56 / 20 = 0.780). However, the batter “A” concretely produces 10 runs and the “B” generates 30. That is three times more!!! So, who would be chosen for you?
If we did a superficial analysis of the CONTEXT, as in wOBA’s final formula, we’d assume as an irrefutable truth (by Default), that the batter “A” hasn’t had the luck to find too many runners on bases, as happened to “B”. That’s due to the fail in specific opportunities are not recorded in almost any Baseball formula (cumulative statistics) before Waibi System (progressive statistics). Thus, by applying the "Average" coeficient, WE FOCUS OUR INTEREST ON ISOLATED HIT AND NOT ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES. However, when we scrutinize the at-bats, it shows that both had similar opportunities. The following chart supports the claim that randomness in baseball is not as absolute as the WOBA mathematical model suggests, but relative:
The chart
shows the homers percentage distribution
by B/O_State, according to the outs in the inning, in the data processed to
create wOBA’s foundations. Why this particular behavior? Although it may seem
exorbitant, the answer is quite simple. When the inning is beginning, most
pitchers search for "reconnecting" with the strike zone, especially
if the offensive chance of their teams has delayed more time than usual. The
most effective pitchers can start the inning directly with more difficult
throws and hitting the corners, but generally they begin with more hittable
pitches. Moreover, pitchers with longer performances, as starters and long
releavers, dose their resources to avoid arm’s early fatigue, and hitters
adjustment. So, this kind of pitchers don’t constantly resort to the maximum
speed, or to their most dominant throws when the bases are empty (as occurs in the
case of closer pitchers), but they use their entire repertoire, looking for
advance the game holding the batters in check. Therefore, specialization has
helped to reduce the number of home runs when there’re no outs, as there’re at
least two innings, in which pitchers are working at full. (Eighth and ninth
innings).
As shown in
the graph, the situation dramatically changes when there’re runners on bases
without outs. Here the pitcher cares much more to prevent an opposing rally,
and he uses most often his “star” throws
and speed, registering a peak in the administration of his best resources.
Another curious thing is that with runners on
bases, most home runs are allowed, when
there’re more outs. To our understanding, for the same reasons. The
pitcher uses his best technical arsenal with runners on bases and no outs,
besides being fresher after resting in the interinning (just like whith batches
in body building). Also, the batter didn’t
had time to make his individual adjustment for this specific situation.
When there’re more outs, the batter in turn, together with the batting coach,
has more time to study the pitcher AT THAT PARTICULAR MOMENT (inning); besides
a higher physical recovery, if he were a fielder, mainly those positions with
greater physical wear (catcher, shortstop, center fielder, or pitcher in the
league without designated hitter). Therefore, the hitter’s adjustment is
greater, the later in the inning they consume his at-bat.
State 1
|
State 2
|
State 3
|
State 4
|
State 5
|
State 6
|
State 7
|
State 8
| |
0 outs
|
5518
|
1195
|
292
|
42
|
305
|
120
|
59
|
78
|
1 out
|
3498
|
1401
|
535
|
193
|
544
|
230
|
133
|
230
|
2 outs
|
3023
|
1394
|
661
|
273
|
588
|
312
|
155
|
247
|
This is the distribution of all 21 026 homers in the seasons of 1999-2002, used to obtain the numeric constants applied today.
To
understand more easily, let's see it in percent:
State 1
|
State 2
|
State 3
|
State 4
|
State 5
|
State 6
|
State 7
|
State 8
|
|
| 0 outs |
26,24
|
5,68
|
1,39
|
0,20
|
1,45
|
0,57
|
0,28
|
0,37
|
| 1 out |
16,64
|
6,66
|
2,54
|
0,92
|
2,59
|
1,09
|
0,63
|
1,09
|
| 2 outs |
14,38
|
6,63
|
3,14
|
1,30
|
2,80
|
1,48
|
0,74
|
1,17
|
| totales |
57,26
|
18,98
|
7,08
|
2,42
|
6,83
|
3,15
|
1,65
|
2,64
|
In the state 1, that is "bases empty", occur the 57.26% of homers !! To wOBA, without the compensation of 15% to match up to the OBP, a home run should value approximately 1.70 runs. But actually, according to used data, the 57.26% of homers produce a single run, and the 28.48% produces 2. Only 2.64% of the homers produce an ammount of 4 runs, which give a special value to the hitters included in this group.
But why in the
State 7 (runners on second and thirth) the pitchers allow lest homers than with
bases loaded? The reason is that in the State 7, the first base is empty. So,
the pitchers aren’t required to hit the strike zone, like in the State 8.
As the algorithm used by wOBA is
based on the concept of the averages, to be realistic it requires at least that:
- Each pitcher acts in the same way in any situation, in any inning, with any score, against any hitter.
- All League’s pitchers have the same quality.
- All League’s hitters have the same quality.
- The situations occur in proportion to the number of runs they produce. That is, a B/O_State of “bases empty" should occur four times more than a state of "bases loaded".
- All hole places have the same opportunities.
- All parks have the same characterístics
As the sides
of the dice. That way, the graphic obtained should show this:
That’s to say, to make sense to use the same Run Value for all homers, the frequency of opportunities should be of 100 "bases loaded” at-bats for every 133 with "two on base", 200 with "one on base" and 400 with "bases empty". Or what it’s the same, one Grand Slam opportunity every 8.33 appearances. In addition, the frequency of opportunity, must be the same for the whole line up. As we saw in RBI’s article, hitters with more offensive responsibility will find a greater number of runners on base, resulting in a greater chance of producing runs for each homer.
Actually, proportions are very
different from the model. If the ideal
conditions were met, an average run should be worth 2.5 runs. Registering 1.70, the first thought
is that B/O_States with more runners on base occur less frequently (in every
innings there’re at least a situation of "bases empty", but rarely a
"bases loaded" one). But not only
it occurs less frequently, but is also MORE DIFFICULT TO SUCCEED,
because the pitcher works at his full
capacity. For these reasons,
Grand Slams are usually hitted by great hitters, or in winning streak.
The average however, understands that homers not only produce the same amount
of runs, but also have the same difficulty level, favoring those batters who
hit homers in less complex situations, and therefore, with more possibilities
to succeed. This is precisely the opposite of what wOBA’s concept claims . For
example: in the formula, if facing pitchers of equal quality, a player hits 10
home runs with empty bases , and another one 10 Grand Slams, both with no outs,
they have the same Run Value of 1.95 per homer. The second one, however, is a
much better hitter, because he faces pitcher performing at 100% capacity.
Let's make a visual comparison
between the behavior of Homer’s Run Value posed by the coefficients of wOBA’s
model, and what really happen on the data that were processed to obtain them:
The first
group of columns shows the proportion of RBI by homer, and the second, the frequency
of these ones to achieve such behavior; namely, that hypothetically all homers have the same actual value like wOBA suggests. Yellow represents
the home runs with empty bases, and descends to red, showing the homers with
the bases loaded. This is the necessary distribution to wOBA be 99.99%
reliable. Recall that when the same value is given to all homers (always
multiply by 1.95) it means that everyone has about the same level of
difficulty, and that opportunities are presented in a compensatory sequence,
among other parities seen before.
The third
group of columns shows the distribution of RBIs for home runs, in the seasons
analized to create wOBA ('99 -'02) ; and fourth, the homers by runners found in
circulation. As clearly seen, the Grand Slams of average model (employed by
wOBA) occur 3.7 times more than in a real game. It’s enough to say there were
666 244 at-bats, with a frequency of one homer every 31.69. However, the Grand
Slams, which according to the modeling scheme
must occur each 264 AB, in the real game, they occur each 1 200.
SEASON
|
TOTAL GS
|
LEADERS
|
GS HITERS
| |
2014
|
83
|
2 (3) David Mesoraco
|
73
| |
2013
|
96
|
2(3) Mike Napoli
|
84
| |
2012
|
125
|
(3) Nick Swisher
|
104
| |
2011
|
115
|
(3) R. Canó
|
102
| |
2010
|
144
|
3(3) Y. Betancourt
|
120
| |
2009
|
143
|
(5) Albert Pujols
|
115
|
|
As the table shows, there has
been a significant drop in Grand Slam production in the recent seasons, going
down about 42% in the most recent five. In 2014 only 73 batters homered with
the bases loaded. Only two connected 3, but Mesoraco did it in less at-bats. This progressive decrease is mainly
due to the general increase in the pitching quality. The frecuency was 1 per
2 436 plate appearances!
BRIEF
INTRODUCTION TO WAIBI’S OFFENSIVE PULSE
As we
conclude that:
A. One thing is TEAM’S Run Expectation
(where is very important the amount of outs) and another is the Specific Value
of those Runs Produced by the BATTER, where it doesn’t matter how many outs exist, but just the runs scored because of his
performance with some runners on base.
B. The Runs Value in wOBA is completely
situational. This means that it doesn’t evaluate the performance of a player
compared to the average. It evaluates the performance of a player compared to
the average IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION. As all players don’t go through the same
situations or in equal proportion, by using the single average coefficient (for
each event analysis), that situational relativity disappears, wrongly equating
all circumstances. This ignores that the
difficulty level of success varies in correspondence also with the specific
management of the resources by each pitcher. Therefore, the most capable
hitters are the most affected, while the less skilled are more favored.
C. The model differentiates a small
group of more quality players, of all those involved in the league, but it
doesn’t differentiate one player in a small group with similar quality.
D. The aleatority of the system is more
related to the analysis of general fenomena, and therefore its useful
application is also in general situations (to know what kind of hitter should
occupy each hole place, when to go to bunt, which group of hitters not to hire
for a certain function, etc.). However, even though it’s true that Baseball is
a game of probabilities, each specific player in each specific situation,
potentially makes the difference between the exception (personal performance)
and the rule (average yield), especially if he's a great hitter .
For these reasons Waibi Sabermetrics
System redefines the use of the B/O_States in evaluating hitters, and replaces
with the OFFENSIVE PULSE, whose calculation is one of the cornerstones of its
functionality. The Offensive Pulse will be explained on the Waibi’s Web Site.
Suffice to say that it evaluates the passive, active or mixed contribute of each player, from the moment he starts his
at-bat until he comes out of circulation, whether by scoring, out, ending of
the inning or of the game.
Waibi’s coefficients, contrary to
those of wOBA, emphasize not only on the performance of batter, but also on the
difficulty to achieve it, and the importance it generates for the team. Being
based on Play By Play annotation, it allows to go through each situation
particularities, achieving to differentiate numerically, not just situational
yields against the same kind of pitcher, but also to distinguish
between a specific pitcher and another. As we saw in the article about AVG and AVQ, is not the
same thing to hit a homer against the worst pitcher of the tournament, and do
it facing the best.










It seems that your comparison point would best be RE24 and not wOBA. The gaps you note in wOBA are intentional, and are handled by RE24. Of course, the limitations of RE24 are also intentional, and are otherwise handled by wOBA!
ReplyDeleteHI, Tangotiger. First of all, thank you very much for your comment. I’m honored by your intervention. The aim of the blog is to prepare the readers for understanding the Waibi System’s concept. It’s neither better nor worse than wOBA or RE24. It’s a different approach, so it gives a different type of information. But it’s complex to understand, so we use formulas that people know, to explain them why and how we’re going in another direction. Therefore we’ve chosen wOBA and not RE24, that although it’s much more accurate, has a similar mathematical approach and is less known by the public which read us. That is, we attempt to analyze the mathematical concept rather than the formula itself. We see RE24 as a wOBA’s derivative, so, it reproduces the concept. We’re sure that you use more complex formulas that remain unpublished for professional issues, but if we knew them, we wouldn’t analyze them if they don’t permit us to introduce elements about Waibi System’s functioning. My best regards
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