WHY IF ASTROS HAD USED WAIBI SABERMETRIC SYSTEM, THEY WOULDN’T HAVE NEVER HIRED GURRIEL FOR 47 MILLIONS?
OPPORTUNISM SYNDROME BY WAIBI (Part One )
In this first part we make references to:
- Performance analysis from WAIBI standpoint
- Yulieski’s performance in the toughest events
- The Opportunism Syndrome
- Astro’s doubts, Waibi’s answers
- Medical Sciences and Waibi analysis method. Player Diagnosis
Our forecast has being
accomplished with Gurriel, as with Abreu. I quote: "We hope to see Yulieski finally shining in a top-level
tournament, even though our forecast is he will not. What
we can say is that, although in Cuba Yulieski broked several records, and
Abreu very few, Yulieski will not achieve to emulate the great
performance of his compatriot in the MLB. And
it's probably he can´t emulate others like Puig, Ramirez or Céspedes.” (published on August 5, 2016, after
Gurriel’s first MINORS League game, clase A)
We continue
to insist on our fundamental concept: Waibi Sabermetrics is a system
of selection stats, not a performance (historical)
stats one. The statistics until today, including sabermetrics (at least
the public ones), belong almost entirely to the second group, but are used as
if they belonged to the first one. To understand the
difference really quickly, we’ll say that if all batters of a league hit 10
homers, 20 doubles and 50 singles in 240 At Bats, all calculations would give
exactly the same results: AVG (.333), SLG (.542),
wOBA (.372), BABIP (.304), and so on. Therefore, the analysis from this limited point
of view, would bring us to choose any of them, to play in a more difficult
tournament, assuming that ALL OF THEM HAVE THE SAME QUALITY. This, however, doesn’t allow us
to know which one has greater chance of success.
Selection Stats,
on the contrary, would give different numbers although all players had exactly
the same performance. Sometimes
even to opposite ends, as happened with our initial model-players Abreu and
Gurriel, and that allowed us to succeed in forecasts. Selection stats are those that can predict the performance in a
higher level tournament, using data from a minor one.
It also focuses on "HOW" and not just on "WHAT". Its margin of error is
visibly smaller than a historical statistic. It’s the "HOW" (the circumstances in
which the result is achieved) that makes the difference.
The current sabermetrics partially behaves as selection stats, just within
the same league. But when is necessary
to move players from one league to another (for example, from AAA to MLB) they’re
practically blind, as we’ve been demonstrating.
We’ve
explained the Default and Average Syndromes in respective articles. As our software is already in the testing phase, let’s abound in other
WAIBI’s corner stone.
THE OPPORTUNISM SYNDROME
AT WAIBI
WORLD... THE
GHOSTBUSTER SAID: “THE OPPORTUNISM SYNDROME IS LIKE A GHOST WHO LIVES WITH
US AT HOME, BUT WE DON’T EVEN SUSPECT HE EXISTS. BUT ACTUALLY THE PROBLEM ISN’T
THERE’S A GHOST, BUT HOW MUCH HE ACCHIEVES TO MANIPULATE OUR LIFE WITHOUT US
KNOWING... I MEAN, MOST OF PLAYERS HAS
SOME DEGREE OF OPPORTUNISM; THE POINT IS HOW MUCH THIS OPPORTUNISM CONTROLS
THEIR PERFORMANCE...”
The chart
shows the performance of several Cuban batters, mostly sluggers, in their last
season in Cuba.
Obviously,
with such data, if all players had the same age and physical conditions, a
professional baseball team would give the best contract to Gurriel. In a certain way it’s what happened in practice. He is a hitter from another planet in the
performance statistics “mode”. Therefore we ERROUNESLY expect he
would be the one who achieved the best results in a more demanding tournament. The reason is that neither the
technicians nor the current sabermetrics stats have achieved to explain this really
Big Questions:
- Why, if two players have played at the same time in the same minor league, where the player "A" had much better performance than "B", is the "B" one who achieves to be more effective when is promoted to the Majors, contrary,to what was expected, while the simingly better one (“A”) fails?
- Could we anticipate which player is more likely to behave as “A” or “B”?
Why? Who? Waibi
Sabermetrics is the answer to both things.
Now, let's
see how these players debuted in MLB.
As we see,
far from what hoped, Yulieski had one of the worst debuts, compared
to other influential Cubans in the MLB. Although it can’t
be categorized as negative yet, it’s far from the expectations on which his
high contract was signed. The
obliged thought is: Why in his case, there’s the biggest uncongruence between both
charts?
Let 's start with the obvious
things:
1) The
adaptation process is different for each player. In the specific case of the Cubans, the social
environment, language, family, the contest of immigrant, and the sudden jump to
another level of Baseball, are highly
influential.
Let’s add that the uncertainty of "all or nothing", opens a dangerous
psycho-emotional door, which can be DECISIVE, since the Cuban baseball players,
leaving the island, are exploring at the same time a "new" unknown
world. So, adaptation is more complex.
However,
Yulieski is precisely the least affected by this situation:
- He was the player with more international experience while living in Cuba. This includes three World Baseball Classics, the Premier 12, and all Caribbean Series since Cuba’s return.
- He has been the only one previously contracted by a high-level professional league, when he played for the Yokohama DeNA BayStars, in the Nippon Professional Baseball.
- For the above reason, he knows what means trying to adapt to another culture and way of understanding the game and life.
- He was, at least to our knowledge, the only one accompanied by his family in the adaptation process.
Summarizing, he is among all, the one who has had a more favored
progressive adaptation opportunity, and
with less uncertainties too.
2) The sports condition also
determines. But while it’s true that Gurriel debuted
after spending some time without playing, most of the other Cuban players too.
3) We might think then that it’s because
the debuts have occurred in different years. The movement
and exchange of players, among other factors, do that every season has
different characteristics. So, let’s see the behavior of several of these players in the same
season, 2016.
Gurriel’s performance remains one of the lowest!
4) The most logical thing would be to think
of a SLOW adaptation. Especially because his data in some international
tournaments "guaranteed" his attributes for any high-level
competition.
But, how different would be our
expectations when using the logic of Waibi Sabermetric System? Let's analyze the
most important (and harder) competitions in which Gurriel participated before
his contract with the Houston Astros.
I World Baseball Classic 2006
The sensation
explodes! Yulieski integrates the All Star as Best Second
Baseman, with 9 hits in 33 AB, 2 homers and 2 doubles, 6 RBI, and AVG/OBP/SLG
of .273/.342/.515. The scouts begin to follow him seriously.
The first thing we MUST remember, and this is VERY
IMPORTANT, is how the All Stars, and especially the MVP of each tournament are
elected. This is NOT an objective
choice, but on the contrary, VERY SUBJECTIVE ... Is not a statistical selection
but a media one. It’s a prize obtained by VOTING!!! Means that is more important how
good the player impress the voters, than the real effectiveness. It’s a
"political" vote. Therefore, for a manager, scout or coach, integrating an
All Star should not be important to choose one player over another, but simply an
anecdotic data.
On the other hand, the great
impression made by the Cuban team when won the Silver Trophy, confused many
baseball people.
Explosiveness, desire and team spirit were the most important forces. As always, the EPIC seduces us more than the OBJECTIVE.
Therefore, some circumstantial elements aren’t taken into account when the
numbers are interpreted, however being decisive for choosing a player for our
Baseball team:
- SPORTS CONDITION: In the first WBC, Cubans were in full fitness. They even interrupted their official championship (NBS) to attend The Classic. Most of the Major Leagues players, took the tournament as the begining of their Spring Training. They were practically returning from their vacations.
- SCOUTING: Cubans had access to detailed information about their rivals from the Majors, both in video and in sabermetric statistics. The faced teams didn’t know the Cubans. Nor they could take advantage of the Cuban National Series stats, because Cubans didn’t published data informations on the web, at that time.
- SHORTS TOURNAMENT: Over the years, Cuba specialized in playing short championships. It’s a completely different kind of game system, where we’ve to adjust each strategic move in a very short time. It’s not enough to know how to play baseball. The instinct and the ability to move the players is determinant most of the time. Short tournaments are about exactly moments, and not stats numbers. This experience was one of the most important things in the progress towards the runner-up, with an opportune manage of the bullpen and line up.
Therefore, although Cuba has
obtained a deserved second place, subjectivity MUST NOT make us believe that
Cubans were the second best players.
Yulieski’s
mirage is bigger, because most of us haven’t thought (or just remembered) that
his outstanding offensives data were collected in the first two games. The
rivals were Panama and Netherlands. Remember that in 2006, Netherlands was
still a team without international prominence. After those two
games, pitchers didn’t allow him freedoms, especially in pressure games. So, he
was voted to the All Star team, for the good impression given in the first two
matches (including a really decisive two-runs homer), and for his timely
performance at defense. As an alarming
detail, it’s sufficent to say that in the 8 games, in the last 6 he only
produced one run, which was a solo homer. He failed when trying to bring to the plate ALL
RUNNERS HE FOUND ON BASES IN THE THREE LAST QUARTERS (75%) OF THE TOURNAMENT!!!
Unfortunately we don’t have detailed information about
the II Classic, or sufficient videos about Gurriel. It was APARENTLY his best performance at
WBCs. The official site, unfortunately, starts the "play by play" in
2013, corresponding to III Classic.
III World Baseball Classic (2013)
Unlike in the first and the second, many teams attended
better prepared. It’s the main reason
why Cuba was going down in the final table as new editions of the
Classic were disputed. This allowed us to
see a level closer to reality.
During the tournament Yulieski was, once again, the most
criticized from the island, due to his really little transcendency in
international events, compared with his huge performance in the Cuban national
series. For this, he was constantly
moved in the line up, between the second and seventh positions mainly.
In this period Waibi
Sabermetrics System was born, which sought to understand the incongruities in
the performance of several players compared to
others, when facing stronger tournaments. Gurriel’s "cold" data were amazing, but by
processing it with our still incipient system, we forecast a performance in the
WBC under the average, due to his bad BQI (Batting Quality Index, a Waibi
formula). Players took the III WBC
seriously. Therefore quality and
difficulty were much higher. Having a
greater concentration of quality, and being
Gurriel an effective batter when facing preferably lower level situations,
his numbers would drop significantly, unless rival pitchers had a bad performance.
Where P’s GOBP is
Pitcher’s Game OBP.
In the case of Tanaka, it’s good to note, he relieved to
get into shape in a match in which both rivals were classified. Tanaka opened allowing hit and double. After that only another single, but accompanied
by six great strikeouts, including Gurriel’s.
The chinese Liu Yu was practically the only pitcher with a bad performance
that Gurriel didn’t beat. Noris faced just two hitters. For the rest, those throwers against he just failed,
all had good performances. Contrarywise,
those against he obtained his hits, all had a bad day. This is an extreme case of Opportunism, very
rare.
Obviously, it’s also linked to the psychological pressure
experienced by Cuban players in these tournaments, because of the way Baseball is
handled in Cuba. The media phenomenon, the contrast in performances, and the sports
press ramblings, were what brought us to
put our magnifying glass on Gurriel. We
were lucky to have followed him since his first National Series, because
otherwise we would’ve never made us these questions. As we've said before, it’s an extremely rare case.
As shown, the data were down, insofar as the difficulty of the competition
increased. After the last Classic,
Yulieski retook his usual rhythm as slugger and runs producer in the Cuban Series,
wich was interrupted to attend the Classic.
It was as if the
Classic had never existed. It was NOT,
therefore, a SLUM.
Japanese Baseball
Before passing through Japan,
Yulieski was assigned to the Industriales of Havana, which, as the New York
Yankees, is a team under pressure in all games throughout the country. Everyone
wants to beat them.
Hence the 90 games of the regular season are very hard for the team of the
Cuban capital. Let’s imagine the playoffs!! This permanent pressure, and to play at the stadium
where he was more repeatedly whistled and jeered before, but now applauded,
helped him to mature psychologically. His data were more potentiated. This coincided
with a league quality decline, due to many reasons.
The
following year, 2014, Yulieski was hired in Japanese baseball, the second best
in the world. We were surprised about his numbers: 73 hits
in 239 AB, 20 doubles, 11 home runs, AVG/OBP/SLG of .305/.349/.536,... and 30
RBI. Initially
we thought that Japanese (which are extremely technical players) had corrected
him some technical errors... Or maybe, the Japanese league isn't as hard as
we thought before! After all our references for that belief were
the same international tournaments where Cuba had good performances with their
national teams, despite having a quality league level between AA and AAA. This is a frequent mistake, where (also by default) the
national leagues are valued according to the national teams quality. We understood in this way, that very probably Cuban National Series is closer
to the Japanese league than the Japanese one to the Majors.
It was precisely
in Japanese baseball where we tried to verify a part of our initial theory, but
there’s not enough public statistical information. Note the
frequency table above (the second one). As highlighted in red, Gurriel, who
apparently had good numbers, was the one with least homers per at bat (HR/AB). And he was once again the least effective when pushing runs.
Even though he performed an average of .305, he towed just 0,13 runs per AB. Surprisingly he was even worse than Cepeda, who
achieved just 0,194 of AVG, but 0,17 ribbies per AB.
Precisely, the amount of Gurriel’s MLB contract is based on his slugger yield. So,
Houston Astros expectations were that he could produce a lot of the runs they
need, principally by hitting extrabases. After all, he hit 11 homers at NPB,
with great AVG! But, unfortunately for Houston Astros, they used
the conventional statistical system (performance stats), and not Waibi (selection stats).
One important difference, among others, is that current statistical system
can´t see the following “small details”. Let’s see Gurriel’s NPB homers. We
gather the specific data manually.
Surprising!!
no? He produced only 12 RBI with 11 HRs!!
A more alarming data unfortunately we can’t detail, is that he produced less ribbies
than extrabases! 30
with 31!! All this occupying the high side of the line up, which finds
more runners on bases, and knowing that running bases is one of the strengths
of Japanese baseball.
Mmmhhh, definitely something is happening here... Note also that the maximum
speed was 90.7 M/H (near the average fastball in the Cuban League), the pitches
were almost all in his hottest batting area, and only once he was below in the count. Also, Gurriel’s homers occurred in no-complex moments for
the pitcher, where, as we had explained, they don’t apply to 100%, generating advantanges
for the batter. To slightly remember this, let’s recall the graph of home runs
distribution by Base/Outs States, designed by Waibi for our article about Tom Tango’s wOBA, and the Average Syndrome.
Remember, the B/O State group 1 corresponds to
clean bases situations. States in groups 2,3 and 4 occur when there’s a runner,
and States in columns 5,6 and 7, when there’re two runners. Finally, the 8th B/O
state set is when all bases are loaded. The "green" points are the situations with no outs,
"yellow" ones with 1 out, and the "red" ones represent
situations with two outs. There’s 24 Base/Outs States.
As shown, it’s far easier to hit a home run (or any sort
of INTENTIONAL hit) when the pitcher has clean_bases/no_outs situation, than
when he have men in circulation without outs. The proportion between states is
highly variable too. I suggest you to read our full corresponding article for
better understanding, because this lonely graph shows only partial information.
To reach this
graph (and such conclusions) we started to think from the baseball player
perspective, and not from the statistical procedures one. If the theoretical approach was correct,
statistics would confirm it. And so it happened.
Usually, the sabermetrics analysis put more weight in mathematical reasoning
than in the psychological one, hence these behaviors go unnoticed. It’s because we tend to
read the game from the rigidity of the algorithms and not from the flexibility with
which each player manages each specific situation in the game.
Caribbean Series 2015. Cuba is the Champion!
Home Run by Yulieski!! No as epic as
those of his father Lourdes, known as the Man of Great Moments in Cuba becouse
of his opportune batting in the hardest games, but anyway, it was a decisive
home run. When Yobal
Dueñas decided the Intercontinental Cup 2002 in Havana, with a huge home run
against Korea, according to Yobal recount, Lourdes shouted him some instructions
when he was batting. Lourdes was a great hitter of fastballs in the high-inside
corner, possibly the most uncomfortable regular throw in the ‘80s.
Who has seen Yulieski playing baseball, notes straight away that his technique is very effective against this type of pitches. Contrary to most players, he’s a killer in this situations. Therefore, a pitcher most throw to the inner-upper area only occasionally, intending to surprise the batter, but knowing too that to throw it repeatedly versus this particular batter, is practically commit suicide. This is his specialty.
Who has seen Yulieski playing baseball, notes straight away that his technique is very effective against this type of pitches. Contrary to most players, he’s a killer in this situations. Therefore, a pitcher most throw to the inner-upper area only occasionally, intending to surprise the batter, but knowing too that to throw it repeatedly versus this particular batter, is practically commit suicide. This is his specialty.
Now, let’s check the sequence of pitches.
Therefore, having decided the Caribbean Series in this
exciting way, we create an inevitable SUBJECTIVITY, which usually determines
the judgment we make about a player, IN THE SAME WAY AS HIS PERFORMANCE STATS. To be the protagonist of epic outcomes, doesn’t mean he’s our
best option! Even a broken clock shows the time correctly twice perday!!
AT WAIBI WORLD... THE WATCHMAKER SAID: "OPPORTUNISM SYNDROME IS LIKE WHEN YOU TRAVEL TO THE WEST SPENDING ONE HOUR TO CROOS EACH TIME-ZONE, AND YOUR ANTIQUE WATCH HAVE ALWAYS THE CORRECT TIME... THAT DOESN'T MEAN YOUR WATCH WORKS STRAIGHT, BUT THAT IS BROKEN"
Debut in MLB
Let 's see now what happened in the debut in the
Majors, regarding extrabases, where fortunately we’ve access to most of the
necessary data. We repeat: this is the most important
point in the case of Gurriel, because this is what supposedly justifies his 47
millions supercontrat. He was assumed by his capacity as slugger.
As shown,
the pattern repeats. 9 of the
10 extrabases hits occurred during bad performances of the pitchers!! This, independently of their global quality.
Only one had an average output. Speed also shows
only two throws between 93-95 miles. And this thanks
to adjustments he made in his recent trainings.
But...
there’s a more hidden “small detail”: What about Yulieski’s offensive contribution
when Astros more needed him? I mean, when they were disputing
the Wild Card. With 10 games to close
the regular season, the situation was: Blue Jays (83-69), Orioles (82-70),
Tigers (80-70), Astros (81-71), Mariners (80-72) and Yankees (79-72) were
fighting hard for the Wild Card. The
farthest from Astros were the Yankees, 1.5 games away.
In those 10 remaining games, Houston faced the Angels (in very good streak) and
the Mariners, that were also fighting for the Wild Card.
Houston finished with five less games won (84) than
Blue Jays and Orioles (89).
This means that in the last 5 games the Wild Card was already defined for
Astros’ options. Besides the Mariners finished with 86 wins, so
they had chances untill before the last 3 games. So, Seattle's definition occurred precisely when they faced Astros. This
means that in the last 12 Astros’ games, the first 9 were really tension
matches, while the last 3 (including the last one against Seattle) were mere
formality. Neither
the Astros nor the rivals, had already nothing at stake. Knowing this context, let's see how Gurriel distributed his numbers
in the last 12 games.
Any comment is needless.
This pattern is what Waibi
recognized as OPPORTUNISM SYNDROME.
And it’s UNDETECTABLE from the current
statistics!!! Only a system like Waibi allows this reading thanks to
its algorithm, on which we keep working to refine its accuracy.
There’re many
factors that influence this Syndrome. Some have already been
exposed in our articles. Others will be explained in our documentary about
Waibi fundaments (currently in production).
Now, the two questions that
could worry the Houston Astros after risking 47 millions:
- Does it mean that Yulieski has no capacity to play in the MLB?
NOOO!!! It doesn’t mean it at all. In his specific case, it’s quite the opposite. We’ll explain it later.
- Does it have solution Gurriel’s problem?
YES!
Definitely yes!!
And here there’s another utility of Waibi as a concept: the Player Diagnosis.
This is the most complex thing because by interpreting
the numbers and graphs correctly, you can know where could be the problems, and
when are coming. You can also adjust the ´specific training, according to players temporary sports condition, before troubles appear. It works in the same way a doctor knows
what to expect when he identifies the relation between symptoms and signs in
each particular patient. Let's
look at a practical example of our profession, which is more illustrative.
As Doctors
we’re constantly facing specific patients, individuals, particularity. Never the
disease. The disease manifests differently in each body, but
repeates a number of features. To cure a disease, the doctors first compile data in
an interview, to know where to begin. The analytical method used in our
profession, leads us to establish a rigurous Differential Diagnosis, where are
discarded those diseases that share these symptoms and signs, but also include
other determinant ones that aren’t present. Doing
this we reduce the number of possibilities.
Now, suppose
that a male patient complaines of "exhaustion" (symptom) and we see
him "pale" (sign).
We think about all possibilities, mainly those with an UNICIST criterion (one
that explains both together, and not two that explain them separately). The patient may, for example, be "pale" because
this is his natural skin color, and "exhausted" because he suffers from
insomnia, have a stressful job, or a high intensity physical or intellectual
work. This is ruled out by the interview, observation and a physical exam.
After the physical exam, a
routine lab test alert us that the hemoglobin is low. For example, 13 g/dL. This could corroborate our suspicion of some kind
of anemia. However, THE INTERESTING THING is that, before attaching
this "overwhelming" data to the disease, it should be associated to
physiology. To
Physiology? For example to gender (sex). What? YES!! Why? Because a
woman with these numbers wouldn’t suggest Anemia, but other probable causes,
because is normal for them. Their minimun is 12.3 g/dL !! It doesn’t work on men, where the minimun value is 14
g/dL. This is one of our first major
differentiations. Simple as it seems, the "small"
detail of the patient genre can ruin the whole diagnosis if not taken into account.
In Baseball, THE COLD NUMBERS are not sufficient for a diagnosis. FIRST YOU MUST TO ANALYZE THROUGH THE CIRCUMSTANCES, AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE!! It would be as vital as identifying the correct offensive role for which a batter is ready, heeding not only his somatotype and isolated data, but also his biomechanics, his mentality, his ability to adjustment, improvisation and reading game, and so on .
In Baseball, THE COLD NUMBERS are not sufficient for a diagnosis. FIRST YOU MUST TO ANALYZE THROUGH THE CIRCUMSTANCES, AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE!! It would be as vital as identifying the correct offensive role for which a batter is ready, heeding not only his somatotype and isolated data, but also his biomechanics, his mentality, his ability to adjustment, improvisation and reading game, and so on .
So, if the patient is male, and therefore the
hemoglobin level is interpreted as low, are then analyzed all causes of anemia,
both acute and chronic. For example, if the anemia
is caused by an iron deficiency, megaloblastic, sicklemia, or because of trauma
or blood loss (exposed wounds, digestive bleeding, internal bleeding...) and many others.
In Baseball, we would distinguish if the player is having a temporary bad sports condition (acute: usually psychological or physical) or if he fails due to a permanent disability (chronic: usually technical, some times physical).
Once we defined the causes, the specific treatment and observation of evolution begins. If necessary, we continue adjusting the diagnosis as much especific as possible, to obtain a better result.
In Baseball, we would distinguish if the player is having a temporary bad sports condition (acute: usually psychological or physical) or if he fails due to a permanent disability (chronic: usually technical, some times physical).
Once we defined the causes, the specific treatment and observation of evolution begins. If necessary, we continue adjusting the diagnosis as much especific as possible, to obtain a better result.
To Waibi, Baseball is not
unlike Medicine, Jazz Music or the Space Incursions. They’re all parallel universes. Therefore, the analysis to
create our formulas have been developed from the logic of sports psychology,
rather than from maths purity. Mathematics is only a vehicle to express
in numbers an extremely complex phenomenon which contains multiple disciplines,
therefore also multiple points of analysis.
As happened to Chadwick in 1912,
most of current sabermetrics responds conceptually to a historical moment in
which the differences between players and leagues, even within the MLB itself,
were more pronounced. The data were functional not only by the
genius of formulas (they’re really brilliant) but also by the goodness of the
data. But today it’s
necessary to take a step further, because players have improved their skills a
lot. Today, quality is overwhelmingly more evenly. So, the
weaknesses of many formulas begins to affect significantly the analysis,
increasing the error of interpretation. The same functional concepts that were great some years ago, aren’t
already sufficient. Baseball is Today. So, it needs Today's concepts.
Returning to
the case of Yulieski, we know that there’s a psychological component, but it’s
secondary to the technical topic. His insecurity emerges when he can’t hit,
and not vice versa (he can’t hit because is psychologically insecure). In his case, his batting
technique makes him look really bad when pitching quality increases. His problem is dragged from his first
hitting trainings in Cuba. Waibi, which is a global concept, not just
numbers, has been able to identify and focus almost ten elements, both in his batting
strategy and his swing mechanics, that impede his success against the toughest
pitchers. His exceptional natural physiological
conditions are those that give him an advantage over other hitters, and let him
have a huge performance when facing pitchers of less quality or in a bad day. Also,
there are many moments in good performances where the pitchers throw without
pressure due to score. This
is what gives him the possibility to get most of his amazing statistics. IT DOESN’T MEAN HE NEVER ACHIEVES A
TRANSCENDETAL HIT, or in a complicated situation. THE PROBLEM
IS THE RATE AT WHICH HE DOES IT.
Most of his
companions don’t have his natural capacity, but they surpass him not only
technically but also in batting strategy. That’s why they’re most effective when facing more complex
situations (and tournaments). José
Abreu is probably the cuban that best combines both. Other non - Cubans as Robinson
Cano, David Wright, or Ichiro Susuki, among other stars do it too. If Yulieski achieved to eliminate these
defects, probably he’ll NOT hit more than 15-20 homers per season, but surely
he’ll hit more than 180 hits, and even, depending on his discipline in the home
plate, 200. He’ll hit a great number of doubles too, but almost no triple.
First thing he needs to know (he and his coaches) is which really are his
strengths and weaknesses as hitter.
Then he must assume it, and work at it rigorously. He shouldn’t continuing to
belive in a statistical legend written just in minor tournaments, thanks to
exceptional biological conditions, but useless in harder tournaments without
the right procedure. His main enemy isn’t age, but the long time he’ve reproduced
the same mistakes. There’re errors that
have become conditioned reflexes a long time ago. It would be more difficult (but not impossible) to make
major adjustments to his mechanics. For his fortune,
his incredible physiology precisely would help him to eliminate this problems more
easily than most hitters. Only in this way he’ll
achieve success in the Majors as their fellow countrymen. Otherwise, he’ll remain untapped in
the Big Tent, despite his great potential.
There’s also the possibility that small adjustments can yield much, but SURELY HE’LL
BE STILL STERILE against the best. It
depends on how things will be done, and how specifics is the Diagnosis he´ll
work about.
End of the first part















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